

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1573

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1206

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME

REF: STATE 19380

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTEL REQUESTS
MBFR DELEGATION VIEWS ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN
FIXING THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASE I AND PHASE II
OF MBFR. FOLLOWING ARE SOME POINTS WHICH WE BELIEVE
IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR WASHINGTON TO CONSIDER. THE MAIN
CONCLUSION WE WOULD DRAW IS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES
SHOULD BE CLEAR ABOUT WHAT IS DESIRABLE IN TERMS
OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS, THEY SHOULD AVOID
ADOPTING A RIGID POSITION ON THIS MATTER. WE WILL NOT KNOW
DEFINITELY WHAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR UNTIL THE
ISSUE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS. BUT, TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAVE

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COMMENTED ON THE TOPIC, WE ALREADY KNOW THAT

SOVIET IDEAS ON THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME DIVERGE FROM WHAT ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER DESIRABLE. AN ALLIED POSITION SHOULD HAVE BUILT INTO IT AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

2. AS WE SEE IT, THE FOLLOWING STEPS BETWEEN CONCLUSION OF PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS ARE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE:

- A. SIGNING OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT;
- B. APPROVAL OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, WHETHER BY FORMAL RATIFICATION OR OTHER MEANS;
- C. COMING INTO FORCE OF PHASE I AGREEMENT;
(IN ORDER TO OBTAIN LONG, DRAWN OUT APPROVAL PROCESS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS, THIS MIGHT BE MADE DEPENDENT ON FORMAL APPROVAL OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS AS THE PARTIES OBLIGED TO TAKE MAIN ACTION UNDER THE AGREEMENT.)
- D. PERIOD FOR PREPARATION OF WITHDRAWALS, INCLUDING PREPARATION FOR VERIFICATION (INSTALLATION OF TEAMS IF AGREED, PREPARATIONS FOR USE OF NATIONAL MEANS). MUCH OF THIS COULD BE DONE CONCURRENTLY WITH (B) AND (C).
- E. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT
- F. IMPLEMENTATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. TIMING COULD OVERLAP WITH THAT OF WITHDRAWALS.
- G. PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW PARTICIPANTS TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT WITHDRAWALS HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED, THAT RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS WERE BEING MAINTAINED, AND THAT THE VERIFICATION AND STABILIZING PROVISIONS WERE WORKING.

3. FROM A U.S. POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD SEEM REASONABLE TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE STEPS LISTED IN PARA 2 WITHIN THE "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME," INCLUDING A PERIOD OF TIME TO TEST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I BEFORE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. FOR THE US, THE GAIN AS REGARDS BURDEN-SHIFTING IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCING US FORCES ALONE IN PHASE I WOULD BE MORE

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CLEARLY DEMONSTRABLE IF THERE WERE A CLEAR SEPARATION BETWEEN THE PHASES. IF THERE WERE CONTINUED DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR FURTHER US REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING PHASE I, IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS IF THE AGREED PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES WERE CONSIDERABLE THOUGH WELL-DEFINED. OPTIMALLY, THE U.S. WOULD WISH TO WAIT TO ASSESS THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF A SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED PHASE I BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PAHSE 2.

4. THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO DOUBT THE VALUE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH, OR WHO ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN PROTECTING FUTURE OPTIONS FOR CLOSER WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, WILL PRESS FOR MAXIMUM SEPARATION OF THE TWO NEGOTIATING PHASES. THERE WILL BE SOME, LIKE THE UK, WHO WILL HOPE THAT A PHASE II CAN BE AVOIDED ALTOGETHER. THOSE ALLIES WHO ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION MAY SEEK TO MAXIMIZE THE TIME PERIOD BETWEEN PHASE I AND PHASE II IN ORDER TO ALLOW AS MUCH LEEWAY AS POSSIBLE FOR THE REALIZATION OF CONCRETE MEASURES LOOKING TOWARD GREATER EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. THEY WOULD HOPE TO REALIZE AS MUCH PRACTICAL PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE BEFORE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS COULD PREJUDICE THE FORMS THAT COOPERATION MIGHT TAKE. THOSE REPRESENTING THIS VIEWPOINT MAY SUPPORT A FIXED PERIOD OF TWO TO THREE YEARS TO PERMIT FULL IMPLEMENTATION TOGETHER WITH A PERIOD THEREAFTER TO TEST AND VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT, AS TIME GOES BY, ESPECIALLY IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, DOMESTIC PRESSURES IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL INCREASE AND MOVE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO ADOPT SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TIMING OF PHASE II.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 1206

FROM US REP MBFR

5. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO PHASING IS, OF COURSE, VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE ALLIED APPROACH. THE PRESENT SOVIET PROPOSAL ENVISAGES A SINGLE PHASE OF NEGOTIATION IN WHICH AN ENTIRE PACKAGE, INCLUDING REDUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN FORCES, WOULD BE AGREED. ONLY IMPLEMENTATION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN STAGES. MOREOVER, SINCE THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN INTENTIONS. THEIR INTEREST IN COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN FORCES HAS CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED. IT IS UNCERTAIN AT PRESENT WHETHER THE SOVIETS CAN BE BROUGHT AROUND TO THE ALLIED APPROACH OF REDUCING US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE AND DEFERRING REDUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN FORCES TO A SECOND PHASE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS IS THE CASE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY DEMAND WITH REGARD TO TIMING THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL THE SECOND
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PHASE NEGOTIATION HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED.

6. GIVEN THESE CONFLICTING AIMS, A VARIETY OF OUTCOMES IS CONCEIVABLE:

A. AT THE ONE EXTREME, THE OUTCOME WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST SATISFACTORY TO THE WEST WOULD BE AN INTERVAL OF, SAY, ONE YEAR TO EIGHTEEN MONTHS BETWEEN THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT AND INITIATION OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH A PERIOD OF TIME WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT FOR ALL THE REMAINING STEPS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, INCLUDING A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME TO TEST THE SATISFACTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

B. AT THE OTHER EXTREME, THE EAST, IF IT AGREED AT ALL TO A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION, MIGHT CONCEIVABLY AGREE TO IMPLEMENT PHASE I IN STAGES DURING CONCURRENT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, BUT NOT TO COMPLETE

IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WERE SATISFACTORILY CONCLUDED. ANOTHER POSSIBLE EASTERN POSITION MIGHT BE FOR SOVIETS TO INSIST ON STRETCHING OUT IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET AGREED PHASE I REDUCTIONS, SO THAT THEIR COMPLETION, TOGETHER WITH ANY ADDITIONAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, COINCIDED WITH THE COMPLETION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ALLIED PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE EAST'S OPENING POSITION MIGHT WELL BE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL A PHASE II AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. BOTH AGREEMENTS WOULD THEN BE IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

C. A NUMBER OF VARIANTS ARE CONCEIVABLE BETWEEN THESE EXTREME POSITIONS. AMONG THEM ARE THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES:

(1) THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE SHORTENED. IT MIGHT PROVIDE FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION BUT DROP THE

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TEST PERIOD.

(2) IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE I WOULD BEGIN AND SOME FIXED PORTION OF IT WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. THE REMAINDER OF IMPLEMENTATION WOULD CONTINUE DURING PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, AND WOULD BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT A PHASE II AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.

(3) PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOLLOW ON WITHOUT A BREAK AFTER THE SIGNING OF A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN "WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" WHILE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS, AND WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE TIME A PHASE II AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.

THESE VARIANTS ARE ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE POINTS ON THE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBILITIES AS REGARDS THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME; A NUMBER OF OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE CONCEIVABLE.

7. TO MEET SOVIET INTEREST IN DETERMINING NOT ONLY THE START, BUT ALSO THE COMPLETION, OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, IT MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE WAYS TO SET A TARGET DATE FOR

PHASE II AGREEMENTS. THIS COULD FOR EXAMPLE TAKE
THE FORM OF A HORTATORY DEADLINE OR OF A PROVISION
FOR REVIEW OR EVEN TERMINATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT
IN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME

8. IN STUDYING THIS MATTER WITHIN THE USG
AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WE BELIEVE
TWO FACTORS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND:

A. THE SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO THE
ALLIED TWO-PHASE APPROACH WITHOUT WISHING TO
RETAIN SOME HOLD OVER THE OUTCOME OF PHASE II.

B. IT IS LIKELY THAT ANYTHING WHICH COULD BE
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AGREED WITHIN NATO ON THIS SUBJECT NOW, AT A TIME
WHEN THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
WOULD APPROACH THE MORE EXTREME EUROPEAN POSITION.

9. POSSIBLY THE BEST TACTIC TO FOLLOW IF THE TOPIC
IS TO BE WORKED ON IN NAC IN THE NEAR FUTURE
MIGHT BE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT AGREE THAT
"THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" SHOULD RANGE BETWEEN
18 MONTHS AND A YEAR IN ORDER TO INCLUDE FULL IMPLEMENTATION
AND A TEST PERIOD, BUT THAT THE ALLIED POSITION SHOULD NOT BE
CATEGORICAL ON THIS ONE ASPECT IF GAINING MAJOR ALLIED OBJECTIVES
IS THEREBY FACILITATED. Humes

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